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Copyrightability of Conceptual Art:  




Hi, I’m Bob Clarida.  Thanks very much.  This is a dream come true for me too, 
because copyright law and conceptual art are two of my all-time favorite things to 
think about. 
But my job here today is not to be enthusiastic.  As Jane indicated, my job really 
is to kind of throw a wet blanket on the hopes for copyright protection for works of 
this nature.  And that wet blanket has a name, which is 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and Rob 
Kasunic, Professor Liu both spoke at some length about this, so I’m not going into 
it.1  We’ve all read it a thousand times and we all know what it says.  It says that 
works have to be fixed in a tangible medium.  That’s in paragraph (a), and then 
there is a list of types of works of authorship, which “include the following 
categories,” and as Professor Liu pointed out, the word “include” has basically 
been read out of the statute.  Courts and the Copyright Office basically take the 
position that if it’s not on this list, it’s not going to be subject to copyright 
protection.  There really is no leeway, I think, in practice at least, for the courts to 
create new categories of works.  So the job often becomes trying to shoe-horn an 
existing work that doesn’t fit into one of these categories into one of these 
categories.  And that’s not always so easy to do. 
In order of appearance in 102(a), let’s start with fixation.2  We’ve talked about 
fixation, this is the new Compendium that Rob Kasunic mentioned; it became 
effective in December 2014.3  On fixation, in addition to the statutory language that 
we all know about, that the work must be sufficiently permanent and stable to 
permit it to be perceived for more than a transitory duration.4 The Compendium 
says the Office “may communicate with the applicant or may refuse registration if 
the work or the medium of expression only exists for a transitory period of time, if 
the work or the medium is constantly changing, or if the medium does not allow the 
specific elements of the work to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated in a consistent and uniform manner.”5  Well, that reaches an awful 
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lot of the work that’s really interesting in the conceptual art area.  Because, in very 
many of these cases, the medium, at least, is constantly changing.  The medium 
often does not allow the specific elements of the work, that is the authorial 
elements that the human being put into it, to be perceived or communicated in a 
consistent and uniform manner. 
Let’s see how a court actually applies this fixation concept to deny copyright 
protection.  Of course, the case that both Rob and Professor Liu discussed earlier, 
Kelley v. Chicago Park District, Seventh Circuit 2011.6  Chapman Kelley was a 
painter.  He did not come into this work out of a vacuum, he was a painter and 
mostly he painted wild flowers in ovals.  At some point in the 1980s, he actually 
started doing installations of actual wildflowers in actual ovals in three dimensions, 
rather than just painting them.  And he had a long relationship with the City of 
Chicago going back to the 1980s, which resulted ultimately in this work—the 
Wildflower Works in Grant Park in Chicago.  The City of Chicago publicized this 
as “living art” before the lawsuit commenced. 
But this living art that they were so proud of and felt such civic pride in (“We’ve 
got living art in Chicago, top that New York City!”), this is sort of a street-level 
view of it.  They decided at a certain point, when they were building Millennium 
Park, they wanted to have some footpaths, some pedestrian paths, and they changed 
the work.  And Chapman Kelley sued under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) 
and the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided that VARA did not apply.7  And 
perhaps not surprisingly, what this case, I think, illustrates, as much as anything 
else, is that the courts really hate VARA and they will go to great lengths to avoid 
enforcing VARA if it is going to inconvenience the property owner in any way. 
So, Judge Sykes in the Seventh Circuit—Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook were 
not involved in this case, so you can’t blame this on Posner-Easterbrook, there is no 
mention of antitrust law in this—but the first thing that the Seventh Circuit said 
was that it was not a painting or a sculpture; under VARA, it has to be a painting or 
a sculpture, not just a pictorial or sculptural work, which 102 allows, but a painting 
or a sculpture.  And the court said this is an astonishing omission, that none of the 
parties brought this up.8  Because, as far as the court was concerned, that could’ve 
ended the case right there.  And the court says we’re not concerned about whether it 
is a painting or a sculpture “metaphorically or by analogy, but really”—and it 
italicizes really.9  So, the court was just not willing to wrap its head around that this 
could be art, let alone a painting or sculpture. 
The court also said that the work was original enough, it doesn’t lack for 
originality, but the real impediment to copyright is not that the work fails the test 
for originality, understood as not copied and possessing some creativity, but that a 
living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation normally required to 
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support copyright.10  So, what the court has done is say that this artwork is a garden 
and a garden is not copyrightable, so there is a sort of syllogism that goes on.  And 
then the court says, “[a]t any given moment in time, a garden owes most of its form 
and appearance to natural forces, though the gardener who plants and tends it 
obviously assists.  All this is true of Wildflower Works, even though it was 
designed and planted by an artist.”11  So, what the court is doing here, I think, 
whether consciously or not, it’s making sort of a quantitative comparison.  Most of 
the appearance of this work is not created by the human intervention of the author, 
it’s created by natural forces, as these plants grow and develop and are affected by 
the weather and so on. 
Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state of perpetual change—they 
germinate, groom, blow, becomes dormant, and eventually die; this life cycle 
moves gradually, over days, weeks, and seasons—but the real barrier to copyright 
here is not temporal, but essential.  The essence of a garden is its vitality, not its 
fixedness—it may endure from season to season, but its nature is one of dynamic 
change.12 
Now, Professor Liu, I think rightly advised against essentialist arguments, but 
that is exactly what the court does here in italics, “the real barrier to copyright is 
not temporal, but essential,” and it italicizes “essential.”13  It has made, I think, a 
category mistake here and completely misunderstood what the work is and said this 
work is a garden, so what do we know about gardens, can we copyright a garden?  
And I think that’s really not taking the work at face value.  It’s not taking the work 
seriously as a work of art.  It’s saying it’s a garden.  So, even if it is a garden, well, 
really, what’s wrong with registering a garden?  As we know, it’s not on the section 
102 list and the Compendium III says about the list of categories in section 102: 
“Works that do not fall within the existing categories of copyright subject matter 
are not copyrightable and cannot be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.”14  
And then the parenthetical below:  “Congress did not delegate authority to the 
courts or the copyright office to create new categories of authorship. Congress 
reserves this option for itself.”15 
So, as we saw in Garcia v. Google, courts are not willing to take on some new 
category of authorship, whether we call it performance or whether we call it 
something else.16  If it’s not on the 102(a) list, it’s probably not going to be 
copyrightable.  The Copyright Office is not going to register it, and the courts are 
not going to allow you to enforce it, even if you take the option of suing without a 
registration. 
So, it’s up to Congress and they’ll get around to that essentially never, so I don’t 
think we can hold our breath for that.  But, I think 102 also presents a bigger 
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problem for works of this nature and that’s in 102(b): ideas and concepts.  “In no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, [or] process,” et cetera.17  Ideas and concepts, this is the basis of 
the merger doctrine, obviously, where the idea of the work can only be expressed in 
one of a very few ways.  But, I think, even beyond the merger doctrine—and I 
think the examples that I’m going to show you here very quickly are not really 
subject to the merger doctrine so much as they really are the idea.  The idea is the 
work, and sort of by intention, the intention of the artist is to make this idea into the 
work, to dematerialize the artwork.  And in particular, coming out of the 1960s, 
that had a lot of weight behind it. 
I’m just going to show you some examples really quickly, and this is the 
conceptual art.  When I refer to conceptual art, this is sort of the stuff that got me 
excited, you know, thirty, forty years ago.  Annea Lockwood, Piano Burning, 
1968.18  Anybody know this piece?  And because of my background as a composer, 
all of these are sound related.  This is Piano Burning; in 1968 there were a lot of 
things burning all over the place.  And in the summer of 1967, Jimi Hendrix had 
made some real headlines by burning his guitar, so this is an idea that was in the 
air.19  I think it’s interesting that the piano in this case is not some elegant concert 
Steinway, it’s an upright piano from somebody’s grandma’s parlor.  And also this 
is a sound piece, by the way.  It was essentially created as a sound piece and not 
just a theatrical demonstration because as the piano burns, the strings start popping 
like crazy.  It’s just really a kind of terrifying sound that it makes.  But my question 
is: how would I infringe this piece?  If the piece is piano burning and I go out and 
burn a piano someplace, what possible action—so perhaps, Annea Lockwood 
brings an infringement action against me, I go to court on 12(b)(6), I say this is an 
idea; what’s not an idea here?  You set a piano on fire and listen to it pop.  I think I 
win that argument.  I think this is an idea and I think no matter how I dress it up, 
even if I use a concert Steinway and I do other things with it, I think all I’ve got 
here is an idea.  So, it’s almost impossible to infringe in a way. 
Similar example, Paul Kos, Sound of Ice Melting.20  Another sound piece, two 
blocks of ice, each twenty-five pounds surrounded by eight microphones on boom 
stands.  As they melt, the sound is amplified.  And believe or not, it makes quite a 
sound.  It’s popping and cracking and doing all sorts of amazing things.  And it’s a 
way of focusing the perception on these things that would seem to be static, and 
actually they’re changing all the time.  It’s pointing a spotlight on impermanence.  
But again, if I put some blocks of ice with microphones around, Paul Kos sues me 
for that—I say this is an idea.  I think I win that argument, under 102(b). 
 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 18. See Annea Lockwood, Piano Transplants (last visited Mar. 9, 2016), http://
www.annealockwood.com/compositions/pianotransplants.htm [https://perma.cc/TS5C-JWFU]. 
 19. See Bryan Wawzenek, 48 Years Ago: Jimi Hendrix Sets His Guitar on Fire for the First Time, 
ULTIMATE CLASSIC ROCK (Mar. 31, 2015), http://ultimateclassicrock.com/jimi-hendrix-guitar-fire/ 
[https://perma.cc/48HP-AYDZ]. 
 20. See, e.g., Mark Stevens, Zen and Now, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, http://nymag.com/nymetro/
arts/art/reviews/n_9214/ [https://perma.cc/7QX8-V6HU]. 
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Another Paul Kos piece from 1970—Paul Kos is in San Francisco, active in 
performance art, conceptual work—Sand Piece, 1970.21  This is not just a lovely 
sculptural cone of sand; he turns an entire two-story gallery into an hour-glass, puts 
a tiny hole in the floor and puts a ton of sand on the second floor and it all trickles 
down very slowly onto the first floor and it makes a lovely cone.  Again, I can do 
that, that’s an idea.  I don’t think there is anything but the idea here, no matter what 
kind of execution I may give it.  It’s a wonderful piece, but I don’t think copyright 
could or should be able to protect it. 
Steve Reich, Pendulum Music, from 1968.22  You hang some microphones from 
the ceiling on very long cords and put them over loud speakers and set them in 
motion swinging as pendulums and as they cross the loud speakers they make a 
sound and you have four or five or six or ten of these going at once and they go in 
and out of phase with each other and they make a lovely sound.  Again, I don’t 
know if that’s anything but an idea. This set of instructions [on the slide] certainly 
is protectable as a piece of text.  I’m not going to play the performance video of 
Pendulum Music, but it’s lovely.  It just goes “whoop, whoop, whoop,” like that. 
But all these pieces are really ideas.  They are, I think, ideas in the same way 
that the set up for a reality television show is an idea.  You put a bunch of airhead 
kids in a beach house, turn the cameras on, and see what happens.  I think I can 
make a show like that and not infringe anything.  Just as I think I can put 
microphones on blocks of ice.  So, we can’t really fix these works.  That’s, I think, 
the real ultimate problem—that we can’t really fix these works.  We can fix a 
photograph of a work, a video of a work, a printed description of a work, but those 
things are not the work.  And they’re a really poor substitute for what the work is 
and this creates, what I call, the “Magritte effect.”  Magritte has a painting from 
1929; it shows an image of a pipe, and the text on the bottom in French says, “This 
is not a pipe.”23  The piece is called The Treachery of Images.  And that is exactly 
what we’re dealing with here, I think.  We’re dealing with works that are not 
reducible to some representation of the work in a photograph or a video or a printed 
description.  The work is not the copy.  The work is not the representation of the 
work.  This painting of a pipe is not a pipe.  So, until Congress amends—and also 
just let me point out, this is not some crazy, discriminatory policy towards artists.  
Architects had this problem until 1990.  A work of architecture was only 
protectable as a blueprint.  Pre-1990, anyone can make the three-dimensional 
structure, just by walking by and looking at a building they liked and copying it.  
So, Congress actually had to step in in 1990 and create architectural works 
protection to give architects real protection over something other than just blue-
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www.renemagritte.org/the-treachery-of-images.jsp [https://perma.cc/A6CR-3F3T]. 
CLARIDA, COPYRIGHTABILITY OF CONCEPTUAL ART, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365 (2016)  
370 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:3 
prints.24  So, until Congress amends section 102, as it did for architects in 1990, I 
think hopes for copyrightability of conceptual arts are, sadly, just a pipe dream.  
 
 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8). 
